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Abstract 
We investigate which socioeconomic groups are most likely to change their risk preferences 
over the life course using data from a nationally-representative German survey and methods 
to separate age from cohort and period effects. Tolerance to risk drops by 0.5 SD across all 
socioeconomic groups from late adolescence up to age 45. From age 45 socioeconomic 
gradients emerge - risk tolerance continues to drop for the most disadvantaged and stabilizes 
for all other groups - and reach a maximum of 0.5 SD by age 65. These results matter because 
increased levels of risk aversion are associated with imprudent financial decisions in the event 
of crises. 
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1 Introduction
Economic theory on risky choices has built over many decades on the assumption that
risk preferences are stable both across domains and across time (Stigler and Becker,
1977). Such assumption simplies the mathematical derivations from economic models,
but in practice it is not likely to hold. The circumstances and incentives that individuals
face are certainly changing over the life-course. Some studies demonstrate that individ-
ual risk preferences systematically vary across birth cohorts due to heterogeneity in the
macroeconomic (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011) or institutional (Cameron et al., 2013)
climates in which the cohort members grew up, and that macroeconomic shocks may
alter risk preferences in adulthood (Guiso et al., 2013). Although many attempts have
been made in recent years to understand the age-related dierences in risk preferences
(Tymula et al., 2013; Mata et al., 2011), almost nothing is known about the individual
time-varying properties of risk preferences (see Zeisberger et al., 2012).
In this study we quantify the degree of change in risk preferences as individuals age
and explore the heterogeneity in this aging process across the social spectrum. The
experimental economics literature, so far, could not ll this gap because it predominantly
relies on incentive-compatible measures of risk preferences assembled for college students
at one point in time. One exception is Tymula et al. (2013) who collected data on 135
individuals across all age groups, but because of the small sample and cross-sectional
nature of the data no conclusions can be drawn about representativeness and true ageing
eects. Another exception is Dohmen et al. (forthcoming) who circumvent the problem
by using a survey-based, but validated, measure of risk preferences to identify the true
ageing-eects of risk preferences over a six-year window. Their study nds that risk
tolerance drops monotonically as people age, and the decline is particularly strong for
women.
We build on Dohmen et al. (forthcoming), but focus on the heterogeneity in the dy-
namics of risk preferences over time. Using seven years of the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP), we estimate lifecycle patterns of risk tolerance by various denitions of
socioeconomic status - education, income, and occupation - to capture all possible chan-
nels through which disadvantage can aect risk attitudes. We focus on socioeconomic
status because it is one of the most widely used distinctions to describe heterogeneity
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in attitudes and behaviors and to make policy decisions. To identify the lifecycle pat-
terns in the socioeconomic gradient of risk tolerance we adapt a methodology used in
Schurer et al. (2014), van Kippersluis et al. (2009), and Deaton and Paxson (1998) in
the context of health and inequality.1 This methodology allows us to carefully control for
the cohort dierences by rst continuously overlaying the paths of adjusted risk scores
of birth cohorts, and then averaging at each age the risk scores over those birth cohorts
for which data is available. The sequence of cohort-averaged risk scores over the full age
interval, in our case 20-80, approximates the lifecycle pattern of risk tolerance. The aging
prole is estimated non-parametrically to allow the possibility that risk tolerance evolves
non-linearly over the lifecycle using the same approach as in Schurer et al. (2014) and
Kruger and Stone (2008).
This approach - overlapping aging proles of risk attitudes of birth cohorts - also
helps us to solve the identication problem when controlling simultaneously for age,
cohort and period eects. It is a widely known result that one cannot separately identify
age, cohort, and period eects in linear regression models without additional - often
arbitrary - assumptions (see Hall et al., 2007, for an overview). As we estimate age
proles within narrowly-dened birth cohorts, we do not face this identication problem.
Theoretically, we could use dummy variables - in our case dummy variables indicating
the years running from 2006 to 2012 - to control for the period eects. Instead, we follow
in our main specication an approach suggested by Rodgers (1982) and advanced by
Heckman and Robb (1985), which controls for the period eect with a proxy variable
that captures the underlying environmental factors that cause a period eect in risk
preferences. Similar as Dohmen et al. (forthcoming), we assume that the business cycle
is one of the most important determinants of risk preferences, and we proxy the business
cycle with gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates. The underlying idea is that
individuals are more risk averse in economic busts and more risk loving in economic
booms (e.g. Brandt and Wang, 2003; Bucciol and Miniaci, 2013). As this is a strong
assumption, we also consider time-dummy variables to capture time-specic variations in
1All three studies use longitudinal data with eleven (HILDA), eight (ECHP), and nine years (PSID)
of length respectively to construct age-proles by cohort members. For instance, Deaton and Paxson
(1998) construct for each birth cohort a dummy variable, and then graph for this birth cohort the health
path and the variation in health over the nine years. The individual health paths of all cohorts combined
display the lifecycle pattern of health. The same approach is used in Schurer et al. (2014) and van
Kippersluis et al. (2009).
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risk preferences in a robustness check.
Our measure of risk preference is the response to a general question on whether the
individual considers him or herself to be fully prepared to take or avoid risks. This
measure is not incentive compatible, and it suers from the same type of scaling-bias as
all measures of self-assessed health, personality, and attitudes. We rely on the work of
Dohmen et al. (2011) who validated this measure by comparing its correlation with, and
predictive validity of, a standard measure of risk preferences elicited through paid exper-
iments. This measure is used in Dohmen et al. (2012) to explore the intergenerational
transmission of risk and trust preferences and in Dohmen et al. (2010) to study the link
between cognitive ability and risk preferences.
We nd that risk tolerance declines strongly for all socioeconomic groups alike from
late adolescence into middle age. From middle age onward, a dramatic gradient in risk
tolerance emerges between people at the bottom and the top of the income and education
ladder. People living life at the top stabilize, and even increase, their risk tolerance
from age 45 onward, while people at the bottom continue to drop at the same rate as
observed before middle age. These heterogeneous dynamics lead to a gap in risk tolerance
between the two groups of 0.5 standard deviation, which is associated with a 2 standard-
deviation dierence in cognitive skills. These dierences hold across dierent assumptions
made about the period eect, they are not driven by a possible misclassication into
socioeconomic class, and they are not explained by systematic panel attrition.
2 Literature Review
Life is full of risks for everyone, yet, preferences over risk is a very subjective matter.
Standard economic theory assumes risk preferences to be exogenous and stable (Stigler
and Becker, 1977), where stability can refer to both individual variation across situations
and across time (See Zeisberger et al., 2012, for an overview of the concepts). Surprisingly,
very little is known about the individual-specic nature of change in risk tolerance and
aversion over time.
This is not to say that nothing is known about the dierences in risk preferences
across age groups. Studies based on large samples generally nd a negative relationship
between risk attitudes and age (see Table A.1 in the Online Appendix for a summary).
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For example, Donkers et al. (2001), using data on a set of hypothetical lottery questions
administered to individuals aged 16 and above from the CentER Savings Survey (CSS),
show that older subjects are signicantly more risk averse than younger ones. Dohmen
et al. (2011), using both survey-based and experimentally-elicited measures, nd a nega-
tive relationship between age and willingness to take risks. Bonsang and Dohmen (2012)
demonstrate a negative relationship between self-assessed willingness to take nancial
risks and age in a sample of older individuals aged 50 to 90 across 11 countries using data
from the Survey of Health, Ageing, and Retirement in Europe (SHARE).
The behavioral sciences send more mixed signals about the likely age pattern in risk
preferences (See Mata et al., 2011, for an overview). Statistics on risk-taking behavior
suggest that adolescents/young adults are more likely to take risks than both children and
adults, especially so when acting among their peers. One explanation for this heightened
level of risk taking in adolescence is not a lack of logical-reasoning ability but a lack of
psychosocial maturity (See Steinberg, 2004, 2007).
A meta-analysis of 29 studies assembling data on more than 4,000 observations nds
that the pattern of age dierences varies as a function of the task and whether the
involved tasks involve a learning component (Mata et al., 2011). On average, aggregating
all studies that involve a learning component, older adults are more risk-seeking if no
explicit information is given in the experiment about the risk probabilities in the gamble.
Signicant heterogeneity though is found across the task characteristics, which Mata
et al. (2011) attribute to dierences in the pay-o structures of these tasks. Older adults
tend to be more risk seeking in games involving card gambling or nancial investment
strategies (Iowa Gambling Task, Behavioral Investment Allocation Strategy), and are
more risk averse in a task that involves risk taking through a physical exercise (Balloon
Analogue Risk Task). On the other hand, aggregating across all studies with tasks that
provided full information about the probabilities and outcomes no distinct age-gradients
emerge.
Tymula et al. (2013) extend the previous literature by evaluating the age-gradient in
risk preferences in both gains and loss domains. This study uses data on 135 healthy urban
subjects and behavioral measures of risk derived from decisions concerning monetary
rewards in a lottery experiment. The sample includes individuals aged between 12 and
90, which are combined into four dierent age groups (ages 12-17, 21-25, 30-50, and 65-
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90). Importantly, the authors nd that older adults are always further away from risk
neutrality in both gain and loss domains than any other group: They tend to be more
risk seeking in the loss domain, and more risk averse in the gain domain. The oldest
age-group members also tend to be most inconsistent in their strategies, which makes
them loose the largest amount of income in the experiments relative to all other group
members. Further, the authors explain the heightened risk behavior among adolescents
that is also reported in Steinberg (e.g. 2004, 2007) with a greater tolerance to ambiguity
rather than to risk.
None of the above summarized studies is able to separate out true ageing from cohort
eects, even though cohort eects could be the driving force in explaining the age gra-
dient. Malmendier and Nagel (2011) show that macroeconomic conditions, a summary
measure for lifetime experiences, have dramatic eects on both the perceptions of risk
and investment strategies. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, this study
demonstrates that individuals who experienced low stock market returns throughout their
lives report lower willingness to take nancial risks, are less likely to participate in the
stock market, and are more pessimistic about future returns. Cameron et al. (2013) elicit
experimentally risk preferences, among others, from 421 urban subjects from Beijing that
were born just before and after China had introduced its One Child Policy. Among many
emerging behavioral dierences, children raised without siblings became more risk averse
than children who had to share their parents' attention across siblings.
To the best of our knowledge, there are currently only three studies which assess the
individual-specic variation of risk preferences over time (Dohmen et al., forthcoming;
Sahm, 2013; Guiso et al., 2013). Using data on self-assessed risk preferences from two
household longitudinal studies on individuals aged between 16 and 80, Dohmen et al.
(forthcoming) nd strong and robust evidence on a negative eect of age on risk attitudes
up until age 65. The eects remain when controlling for individual-specic xed and
calendar time eects. Men are more risk-loving than women - a result that is generally
found in the literature (Dohmen et al., 2011; Frederick, 2005; Donkers et al., 2001) -
but the dierence across the sexes rise sharply from adolescence until age 25 until they
stabilize in old age. The strong dierence in risk tolerance between men and women is
consistent with the hypothesis that reproductive competition drives risk preferences, and
that this competition is more intense for young men (Low, 2000).
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In contrast, Sahm (2013), using data on 18,625 hypothetical-gamble responses from
12,003 individuals between ages 45 and 70 from the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS),
nds only a very modest decline in risk tolerance over a window of ten years. Major life
events have little impact on the gamble responses, and time varying shocks explain only a
quarter of the variation in risk tolerance. She concludes that risk preferences vary mainly
across but not within individuals. One reason why Sahm (2013) cannot nd signicant
age eects may be that her sample is restricted to an older age working population
followed up until early retirement, while individual change may still be possible before
the age of 45.
Finally, Guiso et al. (2013) study the evolution of risk preferences for a group of Italian
bank clients before and after the global nancial crisis. Their study demonstrates that
risk aversion increased signicantly by a factor of 3.5 for the median investor between
2007 - just before the onset of the global nancial crises - and 2009. More importantly,
their study demonstrates that the global nancial crisis led not only to an increase in
risk aversion for Italian investors - even for the ones that were less aected nancially
- but that this increased risk aversion was associated with a higher probability to sell
stock holdings during the worst moment of the crisis, leading to higher real losses. These
ndings emphasize the importance of controlling for period eects, that have been so
carefully accounted for in Dohmen et al. (forthcoming).
Some studies interpret the negative age eect as a true ageing eect in terms of cogni-
tive decline. As the ability for attention, memory, learning, and cognitive control declines
from about age 20 onward (Baltes and Lindenberger, 1997; McArdle et al., 2002), indi-
viduals adopt dierent strategies to respond to risk. High levels of cognitive functioning
have been strongly linked with high levels of risk tolerance (Frederick, 2005; Burks et al.,
2009; Dohmen et al., 2010; Benjamin et al., 2013). Using data from SHARE, Bonsang
and Dohmen (2012) nd that at least 70% of the correlation between risk preferences and
age can be attributed to cognitive skills, and this insight holds for a representative sample
of older individuals from 11 European countries. Other explanations for an age-gradient
in risk aversion are that as people age their motivation declines and emotional regulation
abilities improve leading to a reduced willingness to take risks (Mata et al., 2011).
If it is true that an increase in risk aversion over the life course is caused by cognitive
decline, then not everyone in the population should alter their risk preferences alike.
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Some individuals are more at risk of losing their cognitive abilities, while others age
healthily (for similar arguments see Tymula et al., 2013). In fact, heterogeneity in the
aging process has been reported widely (See Schurer et al., 2014, for an overview). Most
dramatic declines in cognitive functioning are likely to occur within occupations which
require little skills or learning over time such as manual, highly-routinized work. Hence,
a socioeconomic gradient in risk aversion is likely to emerge as people age physically.
An alternative pathway via which a socioeconomic gradient emerges over the lifecycle
is through the increased frequency of negative life events. Generally, risk aversion is more
common among individuals with lower levels of education or economic means (Donkers
et al., 2001; Dohmen et al., 2011).2 Disadvantaged families may experience such neg-
ative events more often. For instance, manual and low-skilled occupations, a dening
characteristic of the working class, tend to experience a larger number of accidents at
the workplace and are more exposed to job loss during economic downturn. As life goes
on, the frequency of these negative events increases, but it may be disproportionately so
among groups at the lower end of the social ladder. As a consequence, through experi-
ence individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds should be more likely to develop risk
aversion than individuals from privileged backgrounds.
In this study, we are not testing one hypothesis against the other - in fact they may
work in conjunction - but we will explore heterogeneity in the dynamics of risk preferences
that is consistent with both hypotheses.
3 Data and variable denition
3.1 Data
To carry out the analysis we use seven waves of data from the German Socio-Economic
Panel covering the years 2004, 2006, and 2008-2012. The SOEP is a longitudinal survey of
private households established in West Germany in 1984, which extended its sample after
Germany's reunication to include the new Bundeslaender.3 In its rst year the study
2Tymula et al. (2013) cannot nd any socioeconomic gradient in experimentally elicited risk prefer-
ences.
3The data used in this paper was extracted from the SOEP Database provided by the DIW Berlin
(http://www.diw.de/soep) using the Add-On package SOEP Info for Stata(R). It uses the 95% Scientic
sample obtained from Cornell University.
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included 5,921 households from which 12,245 individuals were successfully interviewed
("German West" and "Foreigner" sample). Further samples were added in consecutive
years including the "German East" (1990), "Immigrant" (1994/1995) and the "Refresh-
ment" (1998) samples. The SOEP achieved a reasonably high rst wave cross-sectional
response rate of 64.5% and has an average longitudinal response rate of 92.2% (Wag-
ner et al., 2007). The study is set up as life panel, where the household is sampled as
a unit, and the members of the households are traced and interviewed by professional
interviewers every year from age 17 onward.
Our estimation sample for the pooled analysis comprises 135,807 person-year obser-
vations, or 36,105 individuals observed over nine years (2004-2012). Around 26% of the
sample members remained in the sample over the full interval. Another 10% stayed in
the sample over the full time period, but missed one year of the interview. The median
length of stay in the sample is 5 waves. For the cohort analysis, in which we follow the
individuals over time, our sample is restricted to 18,990 individuals or 96,108 person-
year observations for whom complete data is observed in 2004. In this sample, 67% are
observed in all waves available.
3.2 Variable denitions
3.2.1 Risk preferences
In the years 2004, 2006, and 2008-2012 the SOEP included several questions on risk
preferences as part of the standard person questionnaire. We focus on the general risk
question which asks the respondent "How do you see yourself: are you generally a person
who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box
on the scale, where the value 0 means: 'not at all willing to take risks' and the value
10 means: 'very willing to take risks'". The same measure is used in Dohmen et al.
(forthcoming), Dohmen et al. (2012) and Dohmen et al. (2010).4 Larger values on this
self-assessed measure indicate greater tolerance of risk. We refer from here on to this
measure as risk tolerance.
In our analysis, we assume this measure to be approximately continuous. We also
4Non-response is very low. Less than 0.5% of sample members refused to answer the risk preference
question.
8
construct binary measures of high levels of risk tolerance (risk tolerance score of 7 or
higher) and extreme levels of risk aversion (risk tolerance score of 0) that will be used in
a complementary analysis to better understand the determinants of extreme risk prefer-
ences. Roughly 20% and 6% of the sample members are located within the right and left
tail of the distribution, respectively (see Table 1).
Although this risk-assessment measure is not incentive compatible, Dohmen et al.
(2011) have shown in a validation study that it is a meaningful proxy for a standard risk-
preference measure elicited from an incentivized lottery experiment. Dohmen et al. (2011)
sampled 450 German individuals from all age groups using the same sampling framework
as the SOEP survey. The team administered both a survey and conduced a paid lottery
experiment on this nationally-representative sample.5 The value of the safe option at
the switching point, i.e. the value at which individuals become indierent between the
safe option and the lottery, was regressed on self-rated risk preferences controlling for
a battery of potentially confounding variables. The estimated coecient on the self-
assessed risk measure ranges between 0.4 and 0.6 and is highly statistically signicant
despite a small sample of 383-450 individuals. Dohmen et al. (2011) also found that the
general risk question is the best all-round indicator for risk attitudes, while each specic
risk measure has the most explanatory power in a specic context such as car driving,
nancial matters, sports and leisure, health, and career.
3.2.2 Socioeconomic status
To measure socioeconomic status (SES), we derive three standard measures from: (1)
Disposable household income; (2) Educational attainment; and (3) Occupation status
(See Schurer et al. (2014) for the same denitions). All three dimensions are consid-
ered because of the various pathways how socioeconomic disadvantage can aect risk
preferences (Donkers et al., 2001; Dohmen et al., 2011).
We dene four income groups by constructing income quartiles from equivalized house-
hold disposable income which adjusts for the needs and the number of members of the
5The experiment asked participants to choose from a lottery with equal probability to earn 300 Euro
or 0, and 20 rows of safe options starting from 0, 10 to 190. Starting from 0, a participant will switch from
the lottery to the safe option at some row. The value of this safe option represents the risk attitude of
the participant, and only the extremely risk seeking person will choose to switch at 190. The experiment
was incentive compatible and could reveal real risk attitudes as the participants had a 1 in 7 chance to
win and the payment will depend on the choice the participant made on the rows.
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household. The needs adjustment is based on the modied OECD scale which gives a
weight of 1 for the rst adult, 0.5 for subsequent adults (aged over 14) and 0.3 for each
child (Hagenaars et al., 1994). Income is a good indicator for the immediate access a
household has to goods and services, however it does not capture accumulated wealth.
Educational attainment is dened by the highest educational qualication an individ-
ual has ever achieved. We generate four categories: minimum schooling or less, appren-
ticeship certicate, higher vocational degree, and university degree. The educational-
attainment measure has the advantage that it is fairly stable in adulthood. Among all
three SES measures, education is most likely to tell a story of risk-relevant lifestyles
and behaviors, and, due to its xed attribute, it is reective of childhood socioeconomic
position.
Occupational class is dened as belonging to an occupational group based on the
two-digit code of the International Standard Classication of Occupations (ISCO-88).
We distinguish eight categories ranked in order of skill intensity: Professional, legis-
lator/manager, technician, service employee, skilled agricultural worker, craft worker,
machine operator, and elementary worker. The same classication is used by the Inter-
national Labour Organization (ILO) to dene groups according to the tasks and duties
undertaken (United Nations, 2010). As some persons changed their occupation over time,
we assign the highest occupation ever attained. In some cases the individual did not have
an occupation (e.g. when unemployed in one particular year). For these cases, we assigned
the occupation from the last employment observed. Details about occupation reassign-
ment can be found in Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Online Appendix.6 Occupation is the
structural link between education and income: it provides a measure of environmental
and working conditions, and cognitive and psychological demands of the job.
Summary statistics of all variables used in the analysis are provided in Table 2.
6For 43,965 person-year observations we initially had no occupation code. We are able to reassign an
occupation code for 13,815 individuals by backtracking employment histories. For the remaining 22.2%
of the estimation sample we nd no occupational code. These are mainly older women who never entered
the labor market. By re-assigning occupational codes, we face the problem of classication error. This
is particularly likely for individuals who changed occupations more than three times. In fact, 38% of
the sample have more than one occupational classication, and 4% have more than three occupations
through their lives. In a robustness check to the main results, we were able to show that removing
individuals with more than 3 occupational codes does not alter our conclusions. Provided upon request.
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4 Estimation strategy
We start our analysis by estimating the determinants of risk tolerance. Let RTit be the
level of risk tolerance of individual i reported in period t, which is a function of observable
characteristics (Xit), an individual-specic random eect (i), and random shocks "it:
RTit = Xit + i + "it (1)
The error terms "it and i have a distribution of mean zero and constant variance and
are assumed to be independent of the regressors X 0it. Due to the longitudinal nature of the
data, we are able to exploit both the within- and across-group variation, which ensures
ecient estimates. Allowing for individual-specic, random variations in self-reported
risk attitudes, we are able to control to some degree for heterogeneity in self-reports (For
simular arguments, see Schurer et al., 2014, in the context of self-assessed pain).7 The
control vector X 0it includes measures of socioeconomic status (SES) such as education,
household income, occupational status in addition to labor force status (inactive, unem-
ployed), gender, marital status, foreigner status, children in the household, and health
status (high blood pressure, stroke, cardiovascular disease, depression, cancer, and de-
mentia). We also control for period - sometimes referred to as calendar time - eects.
This is important because several studies have shown that the outside environment -
individual background risk (Guiso and Paiella, 2008) or the perception of catastrophic
events (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2009) - can strongly alter risk attitudes. Such an
important event, the global nancial crisis triggered in 2008, falls directly in the middle
of our available sample time periods. Guiso et al. (2013) have demonstrated for a sample
of Italian investors that risk aversion increased signicantly by a factor of 3.5 for the
median investor between 2007 - just before the onset of the global nancial crises - and
2009.
To document the socioeconomic gradient in risk tolerance by age, we rst estimate a
linear random eects model and predict the unexplained, permanent part of risk tolerance
purged of the inuence of all control variables and SES (omitting one category of SES, e.g.
7In an additional analysis, we estimate the odds ratios of reporting high levels of risk tolerance (risk
tolerance of 7 or higher) and extreme levels of risk aversion (risk tolerance score of 0) using a random
eects logit model. This will allow us to explore heterogeneity in the age eect and assess a possible
asymmetry of the age eect at the extreme ends of the risk tolerance distribution.
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occupation when constructing the risk-attitude age gradient by occupational groups). In
a second step, we apply bivariate kernel regression methods to estimate the relationship
between the permanent component in risk tolerance and age for the socioeconomic group
that was omitted from the list of SES control variables in the rst-step regression model.
Kernel regression methods are exible as they do not impose a functional form for the
relationship between risk attitude levels and age (Wand and Jones, 1995). The estimated
relationships between risk tolerance and age are plotted graphically between the ages of
20 and 80. A similar procedure was used in Kruger and Stone (2008) and Schurer et al.
(2014) to plot pain-age proles. Permanent risk tolerance levels are standardized to mean
0 and standard deviation of 1 in all samples to express dierences in risk tolerance across
the socioeconomic groups in terms of sample standard deviations.
Although this specication allows us to exploit some features of the longitudinal data,
we do not have enough time periods available to truly follow the risk-preference proles
from late adolescence into old age. At maximum, we have nine years of data available
- seven actual data points - over which we could follow individuals. Therefore, we can-
not judge whether the age eects represent true aging or dierences in risk preferences
across birth cohorts. To solve this identication problem we overlap aging proles of risk
attitudes of individuals born in the same year so that we can follow individuals from
late adolescence into old age. The lifecycle patterns of risk tolerance are therefore ap-
proximated by averaging risk tolerance levels across overlapping birth cohorts in each
available age-group (See Schurer et al., 2014; van Kippersluis et al., 2009; Deaton and
Paxson, 1998, for applications in health). This method involves four steps: in a rst step
we generate twelve birth cohorts each born within a ve-year window; in a second step
we estimate the permanent component in risk tolerance as outlined above for each of
the twelve birth cohorts; in a third step we estimate non-parametrically for each cohort
and each socioeconomic group the relationship between the permanent component in risk
tolerance and age; in a fourth step, we average at each age-data point the permanent
component in risk tolerance across the overlapping cohorts.
Similar to Schurer et al. (2014), van Kippersluis et al. (2009), and Deaton and Paxson
(1998) we dene a birth cohort for a ve-year interval. The oldest birth cohort includes
individuals born between 1930 and 1935 (average age of 72 in 2004 and 80 in 2012) and the
youngest birth cohort includes individuals born between 1980 and 1985 (average age of
12
22 in 2004 and 30 in 2012). Each of the twelve cohorts can be followed over seven years.8
The overlapping risk tolerance paths of these cohorts are then plotted non-parametrically
by socioeconomic groups: (1) minimum education versus university education, (2) low
versus high household income, and (3) manual/elementary versus professional/managerial
occupations.
Table 3 illustrates the idea with four birth cohorts. The 1940-44 cohort ages from 60
to 72 during the seven waves of the panel; the 1945-49 cohort ages from 55 to 67; the
1959-54 cohort ages from 50 to 62; and the 1955-1959 cohort ages from 45 to 57. For
instance, at ages 60, 61, and 62, we have three overlapping cohorts, and at age 59, we
have two overlapping cohorts, and so on. In the full data, age eects are identied by
three cohorts for age-groups 30 to 65, by two cohorts between 25 and 30 and 65 and 70,
and by one cohort for individuals younger than 25 and older than 72. The advantage
of our data is that for every birth cohort at every considered age-data point we have
1000-2500 observations (see Table A.4 in the Online Appendix) in the aggregate, and
between 42-150 observations for the smallest socioeconomic groups (see Tables A.5 - A.8
in the Online Appendix).
This approach - overlapping aging proles of risk attitudes of twelve birth cohorts -
helps to avoid the identication problem when estimating simultaneously age, cohort and
period eects. It is widely known that one cannot separately identify age, cohort, and pe-
riod eects in linear regression models without additional - often arbitrary - assumptions
(see Hall et al., 2007, for an overview).9 As we estimate age proles within each birth
cohort, we do not face this identication problem. Theoretically, we could use dummy
variables - in our case dummy variables indicating the years running from 2006 to 2012
- to control for the period eects. Instead, we follow an approach suggested by Rodgers
(1982) and advanced by Heckman and Robb (1985), which controls for the period eect
with a proxy variable that captures the underlying environmental factors that cause a
period eect in risk preferences.
8Strictly speaking, we follow each birth cohort over a time interval of nine years, i.e. from 2004 to
2012. However, we have only in seven of the nine years data available on risk preferences. This leaves us
with two gaps in the data sequence, for which the change in age is two years instead of one, a trade-o
we have to make to maximize the total number of time observations available for each individual.
9For instance, Mason et al. (1973) proposed that the eects can be estimated if the coecients of
some of the dummy variables are restricted. This approach requires a priori knowledge of which eects
are most likely to be the same, e.g. the eect of the youngest and the oldest age cohorts, and assumes
additive separability. This approach is generally considered to rely on weak identication.
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Similar as Dohmen et al. (forthcoming), we assume that the business cycle is one
of the most important determinants of risk preferences, and we proxy the business cycle
with gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates. The underlying idea is that individuals
are more risk averse in economic busts and more risk loving in economic booms. Brandt
and Wang (2003) have demonstrated that variations in aggregate risk aversion relate to
business cycles: Risk aversion is high and/or rising in recessions and is low and/or falling
during expansions (p. 1459). Bucciol and Miniaci (2013) have shown for Dutch panel
data that risk preferences vary substantially with uctuations in GDP. An important
assumption is that the proxy is not linearly related to risk preferences, because in this
case GDP growth rates would still not identify the period eect separately. Dohmen
et al. (forthcoming) demonstrated for the same sample that the GDP growth rate is non-
linearly related to risk attitudes. Finally, macroeconomic conditions may matter more for
older birth cohorts or individuals from low socioeconomic backgrounds, therefore we test
the hypothesis that these groups are more vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks. Finally,
macroeconomic conditions may matter more for older birth cohorts or individuals from
low socioeconomic backgrounds. We nd evidence only that macroeconomic conditions
aect birth cohorts dierently, but not socioeconomic groups. Therefore, we include in
our main specication interaction eects between birth cohorts and period eects.10
Despite the empirical evidence, it is still possible that GDP growth rates may not
capture adequately the eect of the macroeconomic environment on risk preferences.
Dohmen et al. (forthcoming) demonstrated that using alternative proxies for period ef-
fects - stock market indices, lagged GDP growth rate or yearly state unemployment rates
- do not aect estimated age-risk tolerance proles in the same data we use. Therefore,
it does not matter which macroeconomic proxy researchers use. Moreover, it is possible
that measures of risk aversion are context-specic, therefore a macroeconomic proxy of
the outside environment maybe too noisy because other aspects of human life matter
more in shaping risk perceptions. Although Dohmen et al. (2011) show that a global
measure of risk attitudes strongly correlates with risk attitudes in various contexts (cor-
10We nd evidence that macroeconomic conditions between 2004 and 2012 aect birth-cohorts dif-
ferently, where older birth cohorts are more likely to benet positively from positive macroeconomic
conditions. The p-value of an F-test of equal coecients across interaction eects between period ef-
fects and birth cohorts is 0.0048. In contrast, we nd no evidence that macroeconomic conditions aect
dierently groups across the socioeconomic ladder. The p-value of an F-test of equal coecients across
interaction eects between period eects and e.g. education is 0.8849.
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relation coecients of over 0.5), risk attitudes in the context of nancial matters predict
more strongly the probability of holding stocks than general risk attitudes. Coppola
(2014) suggests that survey-based, domain-specic measures of risk attitudes are more
appropriate in predicting behaviors in each domain. In a robustness check we therefore
use period xed eects instead of GDP growth rates.
5 Estimation results
5.1 The age and socioeconomic gradient in risk preferences
First, we discuss the age- and socioeconomic-status-related determinants of risk tolerance
obtained from both OLS and random eects regression models. These selected results
are reported in Table 4 (Model 1). Statistical signicance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%
are agged with one, two and three stars, respectively. This rst step explores the
degree to which risk preferences co-vary with age and socioeconomic economic status
before moving on to discuss the socioeconomic gradient in the lifecycle patterns of risk
preferences (Section 5.2).
Risk tolerance and age are negatively and almost linearly related with each other.
While adolescents under the age of 20 score almost one point higher on risk tolerance
than individuals in the comparison group (36 to 41), individuals in the oldest age group
(Age 76 or above) score one point lower. An F-test of equality of coecients across all age
groups is rejected (p-value < 0.01). The dierence in risk tolerance between age group
41 to 45 and the comparison group is not statistically signicant.
A socioeconomic gradient in risk preferences emerges across the education and income
spectrum, but not across the occupation spectrum. Risk tolerance levels are highest
for individuals with tertiary education and lowest for individuals with minimum levels
of education. Individuals with minimum schooling or who completed an apprenticeship
score 0.4 and 0.2 points, respectively, lower on risk tolerance than individuals with tertiary
education (signicant at the 1% level). A similar gradient emerges across the spectrum
of disposable household income.
We nd little evidence of dierences in mean risk attitudes across occupational groups.
Elementary workers tend to be less risk tolerant than the comparison group (profession-
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als), but the magnitude of this dierence is small (-0.14 points). The only large and
signicant dierence is found between legislators and managers - who score almost half
a standard deviation higher on risk tolerance - and professionals.
It could be the case that we do no detect strong dierences in risk tolerance across
occupations because the eects may dier substantially at the extreme ends of the risk
tolerance distribution. We therefore also estimate two logit models in which we assess the
eect of age and socioeconomic status on the probability to score high on risk tolerance
(Model 2) and on the probability to score extremely low on risk tolerance (Model 3). The
reported magnitudes refer to odds ratios, which are interpreted relative to the omitted
category of the dummy variables, which takes the value of 1.
An occupational gradient emerges indeed at the left tail of the risk distribution as
can be seen in Model (3). Individuals who work as operators, manual workers or skilled
agricultural workers are roughly 2 times more likely to report extreme levels of risk
aversion than individuals working as professionals. The same odds ratios are obtained
for individuals who left the labor force or who are currently unemployed (relative to
professionals). Yet, we cannot nd the same occupational gradient at the higher end of
the risk tolerance distribution.
5.2 Lifecycle patterns in the socioeconomic gradient of risk pref-
erences
In this section we present the lifecycle patterns in risk tolerance by socioeconomic groups
(Figure 1). We rst discuss these lifecycle proles without controlling for cohort eects
to provide a big-picture overview of the gradients for all subcategories within each so-
cioeconomic group and all age-data points available. All presented gures display the
non-parametrically estimated bivariate relationship between the permanent component
in risk tolerance - derived from an estimation model of risk tolerance that controls for the
same control variables as in Model (1) in Table 4 - and age. Changes in risk tolerance
over time are interpreted in terms of standard deviations.
Figure 1(a) demonstrates the lifecycle patterns across four income-quartile groups.
There are no discernable dierences in the dramatic drop of 0.5 SD in risk tolerance across
income quartiles from age 20 to age 35. However, a socioeconomic gradient emerges from
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age 40 onward. While individuals in the richest income-quartile group increase their risk
tolerance slightly up until retirement age by 0.2 SD, and the medium income-quartile
groups stabilize their risk tolerance around the mean (score 0), individuals in the poorest
income-quartile group continue to plummet almost linearly up until old age. Around
retirement age, the gap in risk tolerance between the poorest and the richest is over 0.5
SD, which translates into a dierence of over 1.15 units on the original score (0-10).
Almost identical lifecycle dierences across socioeconomic groups emerge when using
education or occupation measures to proxy socioeconomic status. No socioeconomic
gradient exists before the age of 40, but around that age individuals with minimum
schooling (Figure 1(b)) or working in non-skilled occupation/service jobs (Figure 1(c))
continue to drop in their risk-tolerance levels. The education gradient peaks in old age
with a dierence of almost 0.8 SD, which translates into a dierence of almost 2 units
on the original risk tolerance score. Less extreme is the occupational gradient in risk
tolerance; while also peaking in old age, its maximum dierence is 0.5 SD.
We also compare the lifecycle patterns in risk tolerance of individuals who were at
least once in their life diagnosed with depression with healthy individuals (Figure 1(d)).
Although individuals diagnosed with depression tend to report lower levels of risk toler-
ance at any age, the dierence between healthy and not-so-healthy groups remains fairly
stable over the lifecourse. We judge from Figure 1(d) that the growing socioeconomic
gradient in risk tolerance over the life course is not the result of systematic dierences in
mental health across socioeconomic groups.11
5.3 Controlling for cohort eects
In this section we test whether the same lifecycle patterns in the socioeconomic gradient
of risk tolerance are obtained when controlling for birth-cohort eects. This is important
for two reasons. First, the very strong age gradient in risk tolerance reported in Figure
1 may be the result of dierences in exposure to risk across cohorts. Older cohorts
may have been exposed systematically more to risk than younger cohorts when born
and/or throughout their puberty, and exposure to real risk may make individuals more
11We further compared the lifecycle patterns of risk tolerance for individuals diagnosed with high blood
pressure and healthy individuals. At no point in time are individuals with high blood pressure more risk
averse than healthy individuals, except for a very large gap at age 35-45. Provided upon request.
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risk averse (e.g. Malmendier and Nagel, 2011). Alternatively, older cohorts may have
been exposed to more risk-averse parenting styles than younger cohorts and thus became
more risk averse themselves (e.g. Cameron et al., 2013). Second, it is likely that the
emerging socioeconomic gradient in risk tolerance from age 40 onward is the result of a
greater exposure to risk for disadvantaged families relative to better-to-do families in the
older cohorts. For instance, individuals born into low socioeconomic background around
World War II (Cohorts 1930-34, 1935-39, 1940-44, 1945-49) may have been more heavily
exposed to food shortages and economic deprivation than people born into well-to-do
families. In contrast, the younger cohorts (Cohorts 1965-69, 1970-74) were much less
aected by socioeconomic disparities because of strong social equity and redistribution
policies conducted by the social democrat government in the 1970s.
Figures 2 to 4 display the risk tolerance-age proles (referred to as RT-age from here
onward) for each of the twelve cohorts in the top and bottom of the socioeconomic ladder:
minimum schooling versus university education; rst versus fourth income quartiles; and
manual/elementary versus professional/managerial occupations. Figures in the left panel
graph the sum of RT-age proles for each cohort followed over a nine-year window (non-
parametric estimates). The RT-age proles depicted in a long-dashed line refer to the low
SES groups, while the ones depicted in a short-dashed line refer to the high SES groups.
Except for the extreme ends of the age distribution, the RT proles at each year of age
overlap for three cohorts. It is these overlapping data that help us to approximate the
true lifecycle proles in RT.
Figures in the right panels graph the average dierence in RT as individuals age
between low and high socioeconomic groups (solid black line). For each age, the RT data
used to construct this dierence stems from an average that is taken across the number
of cohorts for whom data are available at this age group. The light-grey lines depict the
95% condence intervals. Standard errors used to construct the condence intervals are
obtained with the delta method.
Figure 2(a) compares the RT-age proles between the richest and the poorest groups
measured by household income quartiles. The proles between the two groups are strictly
overlapping up until age 45, but from then onward RT levels of each cohort in the poorer
group fall dramatically, while RT levels remain constant, or increase, for the richest. It
is important to note that the shapes of the RT-age proles are highly non-linear for
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both income groups, but that they also dier substantially in old age. For the three
oldest cohorts in the low-income group the RT-age proles are strictly increasing or
hump-shaped, while for the equivalent three richest cohorts they are U-shaped or mainly
declining. Despite the shape dierences for the older cohorts, the socioeconomic gradient
in the RT-age proles reaches a maximum of 0.4 SD at retirement age. Figure 2(b)
displays the linear and signicant increase in the socioeconomic gradient from age 45
until ages 65 and above.
An almost identical lifecycle pattern in RT emerges between groups of high and low
levels of education (see Figures 3(a) and 3(b)). No discernable socioeconomic gradient in
RT occurs until age 45, but a quick and steep decline in RT emerges for individuals with
minimum schooling, while RT levels stabilize for individuals with university education.
By age 65, the education gradient in RT reaches a maximum of 0.5 SD that remains
constant into old age.
Although we nd similar lifecycle dierences in RT between skilled and unskilled
occupational groups, the occupation gradient over the lifecourse that emerges from age
45 onward is only statistically signicant at the 10% level and is less strong in magnitude
(less than 0.2 SD) (Figures 4(a) and 4(b)). One reason is that occupational lifecycle
gradients in risk tolerance are well captured by educational and income dierences, for
which we control in the estimation model. When dropping income and education variables
in the estimation model, the dierences in risk preferences between high and low levels
of occupational skills is statistically signicant at the 5% level between ages 45 and 65
(see Figure 1(b) in the Online Appendix).
We conduct two robustness checks to ensure that our ndings are not driven by panel
attrition or our proxy of environmental factors. First, emerging lifecycle patterns of risk
tolerance across socioeconomic groups could be the result of a systematic dropout of
highly risk-averse individuals from the top socioeconomic groups or of the highly risk-
loving individuals from the bottom socioeconomic groups. However, when we drop in-
dividuals who are less than six out of the seven available time periods in the sample
(21%) we obtain almost identical lifecycle patterns in the socioeconomic gradient in risk
tolerance. The only dierence is that the peak dierence in risk tolerance between the
bottom and the top socioeconomic groups is reduced by 0.1 SD (see Figures A.2, A.3 and
A.4 in the Online Appendix).
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Second, it is possible that we do not adequately capture environmental inuences
through our proxy of GDP growth rates. Therefore, we re-estimated the models using
time xed eect dummy variables instead. There is virtually no dierences in the socioe-
conomic gradient in the lifecycle pattern of risk preferences (see Figures A.5, A.6 and A.7
in the Online Appendix).
6 Discussion and Conclusions
The major decisions of an individual's life regarding nances, health behaviors, and career
choices are driven by perceptions of risk. Thus, understanding the dynamics of risk
preferences and their heterogeneity over the lifecourse is of vital importance for policy-
makers who seek to incentivize socially-desirable behaviors. We contribute to the current
literature by exploring the heterogeneity in the lifecycle patterns of risk tolerance using
data from a large nationally representative survey from Germany and controlling for
birth-cohort eects. Similar to other studies, we also nd a negative ageing eect in risk
tolerance, but on average this eect is only present until mid-age. From mid-age onward,
it is only the very disadvantaged groups that continue to dramatically decrease their risk
tolerance. Using non-parametric techniques to estimate the age-risk proles within each
birth cohort, we also nd that the relationship between age and risk tolerance is highly
non-linear.
The magnitudes of the dierences in risk tolerance across the education and income
spectrum by retirement age are substantial. A 0.5 SD dierence in risk tolerance between
the bottom and the top groups translates into a 1.15 score dierence on the original risk
tolerance index (0-10). For instance, Dohmen et al. (2010) using the same risk-tolerance
measure and data as we do, nd that a 1 SD deviation increase in cognitive ability
increases the response in risk tolerance by between 0.23 and 0.56 points on a 0 to 10
scale, depending on the control variables included (see Table 4 in Dohmen et al. (2010)).
Translated into our context, a socioeconomic gradient in risk tolerance of 1.15 points
before retirement age results in a dierence in cognitive ability of at least two standard
deviations. Dohmen et al. (2011), also using the same measure and data, show that a 1
SD increase in the willingness to take risks translates into a 6.1 p.p. higher probability
to engage actively in sport, a 2.4 p.p. increase in the probability to be self-employed and
20
a 2.9 p.p. increase in the probability to invest in stocks. Translated into our context
in terms of percent increases, these numbers imply that the socioeconomic gap in risk
tolerance before retirement is equivalent to a 5% dierence in actively engaging in sport,
a 14.3% dierence in being self-employed, and a 4.3% dierence in investing in stocks.
Our study has various strengths and limitations. The main strength is the use of a
large, nationally-representative longitudinal survey that allows us to draw conclusions for
a whole population. In addition, owing to the longitudinal nature of the data source, we
have been able to model individual-specic random variations in the self reported risk
attitudes explicitly. This is especially important as risk preferences could theoretically be
inuenced by random events that occur just before or during the interview (See Carney
et al., 2010, for experimental evidence). Another advantage is that we have been able to
control for birth-cohort eects when comparing the age-risk attitudes proles between the
groups of interest. Sample sizes are large enough within each birth cohort and age-group
to obtain statistically meaningful results.
The main limitation of our study is that our measure of risk tolerance is not incentive
compatible and cannot distinguish between the gain and loss domains. However, we have
some certainty about the validity of our measure to act as a good proxy for experimentally-
derived, incentive-compatible risk measures (Dohmen et al., 2011). Vieider et al. (2015)
show for almost all of 30 countries considered that survey-based questions on general
and nancial risk attitudes capture well risk attitudes that are elicited from incentivized
experiments.
The same survey-based measure of risk attitudes has been used successfully in Dohmen
et al. (2010) to identify the link between risk attitudes and cognitive ability, in Dohmen
et al. (2012) to demonstrate the strength of the intergenerational transmission of risk
preferences, and in Dohmen et al. (forthcoming) to explore true ageing eects in risk
preferences over the lifecourse. A similar self-reported measure has also been used to link
macroeconomic conditions with nancial risk preferences and behavior (Malmendier and
Nagel, 2011; Sahm, 2013). Trading o incentive compatibility against larger sample sizes
and longitudinal follow up seems to be a justiable strategy to gain new insights about
the lifecycle dynamics of economic preferences.
Finally, our result cannot be interpreted as a causal eect of socioeconomic status
on the lifecycle dynamics in risk preferences. We are not able to say that increasing an
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individual's income or education causes higher levels of change in risk tolerance. All we
can say is that we observe heterogeneity in the change of risk tolerance over time, and
that socioeconomic status is a powerful distinction to capture this heterogeneity. Future
research is needed to assess whether the socioeconomic gradient emerges due to a higher
propensity to experience shocks or due to the experience of a faster decline in cognitive
ability by individuals at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
N Mean SD Min Max
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Risk attitude 135807 4.423 2.309 0 10
Risk attitude > 7 135807 0.095 0.293 0 1
Risk attitude = 0 135807 0.059 0.236 0 1
Female 135807 0.524 0.499 0 1
Foreigner 135807 0.057 0.232 0 1
Married 135807 0.602 0.490 0 1
Age 135807 49.949 17.581 18 102
Age below 20 135807 0.026 0.159 0 1
Age 20 to 25 135807 0.079 0.270 0 1
Age 26 to 30 135807 0.062 0.242 0 1
Age 31 to 35 135807 0.067 0.250 0 1
Age 36 to 40 135807 0.083 0.276 0 1
Age 41 to 45 135807 0.099 0.299 0 1
Age 46 to 50 135807 0.100 0.301 0 1
Age 51 to 55 135807 0.094 0.292 0 1
Age 56 to 60 135807 0.085 0.279 0 1
Age 61 to 65 135807 0.079 0.269 0 1
Age 66 to 70 135807 0.083 0.275 0 1
Age 71 to 75 135807 0.067 0.249 0 1
Age 76 and above 135807 0.075 0.264 0 1
University degree 135807 0.214 0.410 0 1
Higher vocational degree 135807 0.189 0.392 0 1
Apprenticeship 135807 0.437 0.496 0 1
No qualication 135807 0.161 0.367 0 1
Household income 135807 24776.770 25115.790 0 3027805
Legislators 135807 0.102 0.303 0 1
Professional 135807 0.168 0.374 0 1
Technicians 135807 0.193 0.395 0 1
Clerks 135807 0.072 0.259 0 1
Service 135807 0.065 0.247 0 1
Skilled agricultural worker 135807 0.008 0.088 0 1
Craft 135807 0.109 0.312 0 1
Operator 135807 0.032 0.175 0 1
Elementary worker 135807 0.028 0.166 0 1
Work not listed 135807 0.019 0.135 0 1
Not working 135807 0.192 0.394 0 1
Unemployed 135807 0.011 0.105 0 1
Cancer 135807 0.046 0.210 0 1
Depression 135807 0.066 0.249 0 1
Stroke 135807 0.021 0.144 0 1
High blood pressure 135807 0.258 0.437 0 1
Dementia 135807 0.004 0.064 0 1
GDP growth rate(%) 135807 1.265 2.886 -5.1 4
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Table 4: Size eects of age and socioeconomic status on risk tolerance and the probability
of high and zero risk tolerancea
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
Levels High risk Zero risk
OLS FGLS-RE Logit Logit-RE Logit Logit-RE
Age groups - Base: Age 36-40
Age below 20 1.11*** 0.96*** 2.17*** 2.75*** 0.41*** 0.31***
Age 20 to 25 0.74*** 0.67*** 1.76*** 2.21*** 0.50*** 0.42***
Age 26 to 30 0.36*** 0.35*** 1.32*** 1.53*** 0.69*** 0.61***
Age 31 to 35 0.14*** 0.13*** 1.10** 1.19*** 0.88 0.82*
Age 41 to 45 -0.01 -0.05* 0.99 0.91* 1.08 1.08
Age 46 to 50 -0.13*** -0.19*** 0.91* 0.82*** 1.45*** 1.46***
Age 51 to 55 -0.22*** -0.26*** 0.87** 0.78*** 1.77*** 1.91***
Age 56 to 60 -0.31*** -0.39*** 0.79*** 0.66*** 1.81*** 2.06***
Age 61 to 65 -0.32*** -0.47*** 0.79*** 0.61*** 1.94*** 2.43***
Age 66 to 70 -0.40*** -0.55*** 0.72*** 0.55*** 2.12*** 2.68***
Age 71 to 75 -0.52*** -0.65*** 0.65*** 0.46*** 2.31*** 2.98***
Age 76 and above -0.88*** -0.92*** 0.54*** 0.36*** 3.08*** 4.18***
Education - Base: University
Higher vocational degree -0.14*** -0.13*** 0.88*** 0.84*** 1.51*** 1.77***
Apprenticeship -0.22*** -0.20*** 0.85*** 0.80*** 1.73*** 2.17***
No qualication -0.45*** -0.39*** 0.79*** 0.75*** 2.40*** 3.67***
Household income quartiles - Base: lowest
Second 0.14*** 0.08*** 1.03 1.04 0.80*** 0.83***
Third 0.18*** 0.13*** 1.07* 1.09* 0.66*** 0.64***
Highest 0.37*** 0.22*** 1.31*** 1.33*** 0.54*** 0.53***
Occupation - Base: Professional
Legislators 0.49*** 0.46*** 1.57*** 1.98*** 0.83 0.77*
Technicians 0.03 0.01 1.01 1.01 1.12 1.16
Clerks -0.02 -0.05 0.94 0.92 1.33** 1.41**
Service 0.05 0.04 1.07 1.15 1.37** 1.51***
Skilled agricultural worker -0.11 -0.09 0.93 0.96 1.70** 2.14***
Craft 0.01 -0.06 0.99 0.96 1.30** 1.53***
Operator -0.03 -0.09 1.02 1 1.57*** 1.81***
Elementary worker -0.06 -0.14* 1.11 1.13 1.74*** 2.25***
Work not listed 0.13* 0.02 1.15* 1.23* 1.15 1.39*
Not working -0.27*** -0.29*** 0.84*** 0.81*** 1.81*** 2.36***
Unemployed 0.20* 0.05 1.30** 1.23 1.89*** 2.26***
Mean Riskb 4.423 4.423 0.204 0.204 0.059 0.059
Total number of person-year observations is 135,807. All models control for gender, marital status, number of children in the household,
being a foreigner, health conditions and the annual GDP growth rate (in %). a Columns 1-2 report coecients from a linear regression
model allowing for random eects. Columns 3-6 report odds ratios calculated from a random eects logit model. Odds ratio are statistically
signicant if dierent from 1. b Mean risk refers to sample proportions in columns 3-6. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01.
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Figure 1: Bivariate kernel estimates of the relationship between age and the adjusted
permanent component of risk tolerance by socioeconomic status and mental health, no
control for birth cohorts
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Figure 2: Bivariate kernel estimates of the relationship between age and the adjusted,
permanent component of risk tolerance within birth cohorts, separately for individuals
in the highest and lowest income quartile
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Figure 3: Bivariate kernel estimates of the relationship between age and the adjusted,
permanent component of risk tolerance within birth cohorts, separately for individuals
with tertiary and minimal education
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Figure 4: Bivariate kernel estimates of the relationship between age and the adjusted,
permanent component of risk tolerance within birth cohorts, separately for individuals
in high- and low-skill occupations
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Figure A.1: Bivariate kernel estimates of the relationship between age and the adjusted,
permanent component of risk tolerance within birth cohorts, separately for individuals
in the highest and lowest skill occupation, not controlling for education and income
dierences
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Figure A.2: Bivariate kernel estimates of the relationship between age and the adjusted,
permanent component of risk tolerance within birth cohorts, separately for individuals
in the highest and lowest income quartile, removing individuals who have less than six
years of data available
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Figure A.3: Bivariate kernel estimates of the relationship between age and the adjusted,
permanent component of risk tolerance within birth cohorts, separately for individuals
with the highest and lowest education levels removing individuals who have less than six
years of data available
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Figure A.4: Bivariate kernel estimates of the relationship between age and the adjusted,
permanent component of risk tolerance within birth cohorts, separately for individuals
in the highest and lowest skill occupation, removing individuals who have less than six
years of data available
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Figure A.5: Bivariate kernel estimates of the relationship between age and the adjusted,
permanent component of risk tolerance within birth cohorts, separately for individuals
in the highest and lowest income quartile, using time xed eect dummy variables to
control for period eects
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Figure A.6: Bivariate kernel estimates of the relationship between age and the adjusted,
permanent component of risk tolerance within birth cohorts, separately for individuals
with the highest and lowest education levels, using time xed eect dummy variables to
control for period eects
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Figure A.7: Bivariate kernel estimates of the relationship between age and the adjusted,
permanent component of risk tolerance within birth cohorts, separately for individuals
in the highest and lowest skill occupation, using time xed eect dummy variables to
control for period eects
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Table A.2: Number of Observations with Retro-
spective Occupations
Without With Dierence
Work not listed 3455 2530 941
Not working 37899 26115 11839
Unemployed 2611 1505 1186
Total 43965 30150 13815
1) There are 43965 observations without occupation information using 2004-
2012 waves, and they are allocated into the above three categories according
to their labor force status. Then we use all waves from 1984 and try to capture
more occupation information from the earlier waves. After this, only 30150
observations are without occupation information, i.e. 13815 observations are
with retrospective occupations.
2) For the observations with age above 30 in "not working", 63.82% are female,
which are likely to be housewives.
Table A.3: Occupation Reassign-
ment
Freq. Percent Cum.
0 30,150 22.2 22.2
1 54,474 40.11 62.31
2 32,382 23.84 86.16
3 13,468 9.92 96.07
4 4,249 3.13 99.2
5 902 0.66 99.87
6 168 0.12 99.99
7 14 0.01 100
Total 135,807 100
Table A.3 shows the number of occupations that indi-
viduals have had. For individuals who have had more
than one occupations, we assign the highest one as their
life-long occupation in the order "legislators > profes-
sionals > technicians > clerks > craft > service > oper-
ators >skilled agriculturist > elementary". Among the
51183 observations that have been reassigned occupa-
tions, 8566 are considered as high jumpers (legislators
or professionals who have had occupations in service, el-
ementary or craft).
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